Metacognition and Abstract Concepts

The problem of how concepts can refer to or be about the non‐mental world is particularly puzzling for abstract concepts. There is growing evidence that many characteristics beyond the perceptual are involved in grounding different kinds of abstract concept. A resource that has been suggested, but little explored, is introspection. This paper develops that suggestion by focusing specifically on metacognition—on the thoughts and feelings that thinkers have about a concept. One example of metacognition about concepts is the judgement that we should defer to others in how a given concept is used. Another example is our internal assessment of which concepts are dependable and useful, and which less so. Metacognition of this kind may be especially important for grounding abstract concepts

Constructing a social subject: autism and human sociality in the 1980s

This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines

Coherent frequentism

By representing the range of fair betting odds according to a pair of confidence set estimators, dual probability measures on parameter space called frequentist posteriors secure the coherence of subjective inference without any prior distribution. The closure of the set of expected losses corresponding to the dual frequentist posteriors constrains decisions without arbitrarily forcing optimization under all circumstances. This decision theory reduces to those that maximize expected utility when the pair of frequentist posteriors is induced by an exact or approximate confidence set estimator or when an automatic reduction rule is applied to the pair. In such cases, the resulting frequentist posterior is coherent in the sense that, as a probability distribution of the parameter of interest, it satisfies the axioms of the decision-theoretic and logic-theoretic systems typically cited in support of the Bayesian posterior. Unlike the p-value, the confidence level of an interval hypothesis derived from such a measure is suitable as an estimator of the indicator of hypothesis truth since it converges in sample-space probability to 1 if the hypothesis is true or to 0 otherwise under general conditions.Comment: The confidence-measure theory of inference and decision is explicitly extended to vector parameters of interest. The derivation of upper and lower confidence levels from valid and nonconservative set estimators is formalize

Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence

The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984] reflection principle (which entails a related constraint pointed out by Goldstein [1983]). We then exhibit the specialized assumption needed to recover Bayesian conditioning from an analogous reflection-style consideration. Bringing the argument to the context of quantum measurement theory, we show that "quantum decoherence" can be understood in purely personalist terms---quantum decoherence (as supposed in a von Neumann chain) is not a physical process at all, but an application of the reflection principle. From this point of view, the decoherence theory of Zeh, Zurek, and others as a story of quantum measurement has the plot turned exactly backward.Comment: 14 pages, written in memory of Itamar Pitowsk

Risks, alternative knowledge strategies and democratic legitimacy: the conflict over co-incineration of hazardous industrial waste in Portugal.

The decision to incinerate hazardous industrial waste in cement plants (the socalled ‘co-incineration’ process) gave rise to one of the most heated environmental conflicts ever to take place in Portugal. The bitterest period was between 1997 and 2002, after the government had made a decision. Strong protests by residents, environmental organizations, opposition parties, and some members of the scientific community forced the government to backtrack and to seek scientific legitimacy for the process through scientific expertise. The experts ratified the government’s decision, stating that the risks involved were socially acceptable. The conflict persisted over a decade and ended up clearing the way for a more sustainable method over which there was broad social consensus – a multifunctional method which makes it possible to treat, recover and regenerate most wastes. Focusing the analysis on this conflict, this paper has three aims: (1) to discuss the implications of the fact that expertise was ‘confiscated’ after the government had committed itself to the decision to implement co-incineration and by way of a reaction to the atmosphere of tension and protest; (2) to analyse the uses of the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in scientific reports from both experts and counter-experts’ committees, and their different assumptions about controllability and criteria for considering certain practices to be sufficiently safe for the public; and (3) to show how the existence of different technical scientific and political attitudes (one more closely tied to government and the corporate interests of the cement plants, the other closer to the environmental values of reuse and recycling and respect for the risk perception of residents who challenged the facilities) is closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy. This conflict showed how adopting more sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a broader view of democratic legitimacy, one which involves both civic movements and citizens themselves

The holy blood and the holy grail: Myths of scientific racism and the pursuit of excellence in sport

Despite the continuing publication of research that suggests there is no scientific basis to 'race' as a biological category, theories of racial difference continue to be invoked within sport to explain the perceived dominance of black athletes. In the case of John Entine's controversial 'Taboo: why black athletes dominate sports and why we are afraid to talk about it' or undergraduate textbooks that suggest 'racial differences' in physique may significantly affect athletic performance, scientific racism is normalised in sport. In this article, the relationship between scientific racism and sport will be examined. Qualitative research with current sport scientists is used to investigate the socio-ethical tensions within the subject field of sport science between professionalism, scientism and the demand from external interests to produce results that help people in sport win medals. It will be shown that these tensions, combined with the history of race as a category in sport science, combine to create the discourse of scientific knowledge that reflects, rather than challenges, folk genetics of black athletic physicality

Can the Experience of Participatory Development Help Think Critically about ‘Patient and Public Involvement’ in UK Healthcare?

The expansion of spaces for ‘patient and public involvement’ (PPI) in health systems in the UK is a relatively recent phenomenon, and yet ‘participation’ as a principle for planned interventions in international development is well established as a field of practice and controversy. Development workers and scholars have passed through moments of enchantment and disenchantment with the idea that the true source of innovation, expertise and workable (and sustainable) solutions is to be found not in the professionals but in communities of experience. Making ‘local knowledge’ the basis of interventions has proved unexpectedly problematic. How could incommensurable forms of knowing, across steep gradients of power be bridged? This article describes a decade-long experiment in participatory development in a remote Adivasi (tribal) region of western India in order to suggest the relevance of this experience for the very different context of PPI in healthcare settings. In particular, it highlights some general points about knowledge practices at the interface, and the human tendency to adjust, mirror, mimic, loop and in other ways make the ‘patient-professional’ interface itself hard to navigate. The article suggests that self-reflective insight into these social processes is necessary for effective ‘engagement’ by professional and lay actors alike